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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, MANAGERS’ INDEPENDENCE, EXPORTING 
AND PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
 
 
[Abstract] 
 
Using data on 157 large companies in Poland and Hungary this paper employs a Bayesian 
structural equation modeling to examine interrelationships between corporate 
governance, managers’ independence from owners in terms of strategic decision-making, 
exporting and performance. It is found that managers’ independence is positively 
associated with firms’ financial performance and exporting. In turn, the extent of 
managers’ independence is negatively associated with ownership concentration, but 
positively associated with the percentage of foreign directors on the firm’s board. We 
interpret these results as an indication that (i) concentrated owners tend to constrain 
managerial autonomy at the cost of the firm’s internationalization and performance, (ii) 
board participation of foreign stakeholders, on the other hand, enhances the firm’s export 
orientation and performance by encouraging executives’ decision-making autonomy.  
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, MANAGERS’ INDEPENDENCE, EXPORTING 
AND PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Economic reforms and globalization of firms in transition economies
1 have 
dramatically changed the boundaries and content of governance and strategy of firms 
exposing them to multipoint competitive pressures. Managers of these firms have to 
make strategic decisions in the complex decision-making environment (Sanders and 
Carpenter, 1998), and one should expect that the performance of large firms may be 
closely linked with managerial flexibility in making strategic decisions within the context 
of the firm’s governance. Yet this issue remains relatively unexplored. Emphasis on 
organizational and environmental factors as antecedents of both financial performance 
and export performance ignores possible organizational effects of managers’ strategic 
independence defined as their autonomy in strategic decision making and absence of direct 
interference and constraints imposed by the owners (Newman, 2000); the situation, which 
enable the managers to provide timely and effective strategic responses in a rapidly 
changing environment (Harrigan, 1985, Mahoney, 1995). In addition, little is known about 
the impact of emerging corporate governance mechanisms on managerial strategic 
independence, although previous research suggests that this may be an important 
                                                           
1 In this paper, we define transition economies (countries) as countries of Central Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. For more details, see for instance: Mickiewicz, 2005. We leave 
aside the interesting issue of applicability of the term ‘economic transition’ to other economies, East Asian 
in particular.   4
antecedent of managerial ability to undertake performance-enhancing strategies 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000).  
The perspective adopted in this paper is that well-functioning, market-based 
systems of corporate governance leave the key business decisions in the hands of 
professional managers, while owners make managers accountable by using various 
governance mechanisms, such as board monitoring and control. In contrast, insufficient 
managerial independence in the transition countries driven by the characteristics of the 
legal framework of corporate governance and legacy of privatization strategies, may have 
negative implications for performance. 
Correspondingly, this study explores the links between corporate governance, 
managers’ strategic independence, financial performance and export performance of large 
firms in two economically important transition countries, Poland and Hungary. Before 
their economic reforms, exporting remained the monopoly of a handful of specialized 
state-owned companies. In the liberalized economic environment, with sluggish internal 
demand, adopting export-oriented strategies may be closely linked to better financial 
performance of the firm (Luo and Peng, 1999). In this environment, how do private 
enterprises develop exporting? We address this broad question by examining three 
specific issues. First, how does the freedom for management to exercise strategic choice 
affect export orientation, approximated by both level and change in exports as a 
proportion of total sales? Second, what are possible links between these factors and 
financial performance? And finally, how is managerial independence in terms of strategic 
decisions affected by corporate governance characteristics of firms in transition 
countries?    5
Our study makes a number of contributions. We provide a new framework 
modelling the linkages between managers’ strategic independence, governance factors, 
exporting and financial performance. Research in this area has been thin and a major 
barrier has been the complex interdependence of governance, strategies and performance. 
While previous research has linked strategies with performance (Hoskisson et al., 2000; 
Makhija, 2004), and governance directly with performance (Djankov and Murrell, 2002; 
Peng, 2004), this paper takes the full governance-strategy-performance paradigm and 
makes a novel contribution by applying Bayesian-based structural equation modeling 
(SEM) to the inter-relationships between governance factors, managers’ independence, 
exporting strategy and financial performance. To verify our theoretical assumptions, we 
use a multi-industry sample of 157 large, private, non-financial firms. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and research hypotheses 
 
Economic reforms in Central and East Europe (CEE) introduced during the 1990s 
aimed at increasing enterprise efficiency and making their products internationally 
competitive. Reforms were accompanied by a structural crisis, exacerbated by the 
collapse of the East European trading bloc and the break-up of the USSR (Uhlenbruck et 
al., 2003). The initial (pre-reform) situation of import protection and export promotion 
through monopolistic, state-owned foreign trade companies meant enterprises were ill-
equipped to meet overseas threats and had different opportunities for internationalization.  
Liberalization and privatization were designed to eliminate the constraints on the 
independent managerial decision-making process imposed by state ownership and the   6
command-economy system (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Makhija, 2004). In the case of 
Hungary and Poland, companies were privatized using a wide range of methods, with a 
significant participation of institutional corporate investors, including multinationals 
(Djankov and Murrell, 2002). These privatizations resulted in a diverse range of 
ownership structures and corporate governance mechanisms (Newman, 2000).  
It has been acknowledged in previous research that corporate governance affects 
enterprises restructuring and financial performance (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng, 2004), 
while the effects of governance on exporting are less clear. Therefore, transition 
economies are a natural context to test theories concerning the first stage of 
internationalization, i.e. direct exporting (Andersen, 1993; Aulakh et al., 2000). 
Our study is based on the strategic management perspective, with export intensity 
and financial performance being the outcome of a multi-dimensional strategic decision-
making process. This process is driven by the firm’s managers’ strategic independence, 
which is defined as “an ability to respond to various demands from dynamic competitive 
environments” (Sanchez, 1995, p. 138). When managers are not constrained by owners in 
terms of their strategic decisions, they are able to take timely actions aimed at improving 
the firm’s competitive position in domestic markets and promoting overseas outputs 
(Aulakh et al., 2000). By being involved in international activities, firms in transition 
economies may develop further their capabilities (Sanders and Carpenter, 1998), and this 
suggests a positive relationship between exporting and financial performance (Luo and 
Peng, 1999).  
Although performance and export orientation in particular may be increased by 
higher degrees of managerial decision-making autonomy, the latter, in turn, depend on   7
the firm’s governance factors such as ownership structure and board composition 
(Uhlenbruck et al., 2003; Hoskisson et al., 2000). Therefore, our framework suggests that 
the complex relationships between governance, exporting performance and financial 
performance are mediated by managers’ strategic independence. The following sections 
discuss these issues in detail. 
 
2.1. Managers’ strategic independence, export orientation and performance 
 
Institutional and economic reforms and internationalization of transition 
economies such as Poland and Hungary imposed new demands on local firms to develop 
their dynamic capabilities that enable them to take advantage of new opportunities, 
including gaining access to new product markets (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Newman, 
2000). Uhlenbruck et al. (2003) strongly emphasize that the continuously changing 
market conditions in transition economies require the development of “strategic 
flexibility” that should help firms to take advantage of existing and new strategic 
opportunities.  Strategic flexibility depends jointly on the inherent flexibility of resources 
available to the organization (Finney et al., 2005) and on managers’ “flexibility in co-
ordinating the use of resources” (Sanchez, 1995, p. 138).  
The importance of “resource flexibility” has been acknowledged in previous 
research (Harrigan, 1980; Mahoney, 1995). For example, resource-based view considers 
the organization’s capacity to change as a function of such firm characteristics as capital 
“specificity”, “slack” resources, the firm’s diversity defined in terms of product 
diversification and/or organizational structure (Finney et al., 2005; Hitt  et al., 1998).   8
However, firms in transition economies inherited from their central planning past a 
bundle of resources, which are inconsistent with the requirements of effectiveness in a 
market economy (Uhlenbruck et al., 2003). Therefore, in the transition environment, 
another component of the firm’s flexibility, managerial strategic independence, or their 
ability to make bold and timely decisions over capability-enhancing strategies without 
restrictions imposed by new owners of privatized firms, may become particularly 
important. In command economies, managerial initiatives were constrained by direct 
orders from the planning bureaucracy (Kornai, 1980).  New private owners of firms in 
Poland and Hungary were expected to unlock managerial talent, but with repeated 
institutional upheavals, organizational learning was difficult (Newman, 2000). Peng 
(2004) suggests that uncertainty and institutional changes in transition lead to a 
deepening mistrust between managers and “new principals”, who may try assume full 
control over strategic decisions. To summarize, organizational outcomes of strategic 
restructuring in transition economies, such as the extent of internationalization and 
financial performance, may be impeded not only by constraints related to organizational 
resources, but also by a lack of managerial strategic independence, or their ability to use 
wider strategic options without restrictions imposed by new owners. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The extent of managers’ strategic independence is positively 
associated with export orientation. 
Hypothesis 2. The extent of managers’ strategic independence is positively 
associated with financial performance. 
   9
International business research considers exporting and financial performance as inter-
related organizational outcomes of the firm’s strategic dynamics (Aulakh et al., 2000).  
Using sunk-cost arguments a number of authors suggest that financially better-
performing firms in an industry are more likely to be exporters (Bernard and Jensen, 
1999; Clerides et al., 1998). There has been less research on whether there is a positive 
feedback from exporting to firm performance. International business research argues that 
internationalization enables firms to leverage their existing capabilities and knowledge 
across countries and create scale economies otherwise unavailable domestically 
(Andersen, 1993). Sanders and Carpenter (1988) suggest that being exposed to overseas 
markets helps the firm to respond more effectively to foreign competitors in their 
domestic market. Firms are continually searching for new technologies, new ways of 
organizing their operation, and firms can take advantage of new information gained by 
exporting that is also valuable when competing in their home market (Bernard and 
Jensen, 1999). Gains from export orientation may be particularly strong in transition 
economies, where firms could face limited opportunities at home (‘push factor’). More 
importantly, given the low level of pre-reform international trade, substantial gains can 
result from taking advantage of external liberalization and export orientation (‘pull 
factor’); the latter could become a key factor leading to improved financial performance 
(Luo and Peng, 1999). Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 3. Export orientation is positively associated with financial 
performance. 
   10
2.2. Corporate governance and managers’ strategic independence 
 
When there is an increase in information asymmetry between managers and owners that 
is related to the economic transition in general, and internationalisation of the firm in 
particular, outside owners may limit managers’ “strategic freedom” (Makhija, 2004). In 
this environment, large shareholders have both the incentives and the means to restrain the 
strategic independence of managers (Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990). Moreover, lack of 
developed capital markets in CEE, limited portfolio diversification and liquidity mean that 
even when large shareholders recognize the potential upside of a particular business 
strategy, such as exporting, they are affected adversely by the company’s idiosyncratic 
risk  (Maug, 1998) and may chose to impose sub-optimal strategies on managers.  And 
last but not least, large shareholders in countries with relatively low protection of 
minority investors, such as CEE, may attempt to take advantage of their power and realize 
“private benefits of control”. This expropriation may take various forms, such as related-
party transactions, use of transfer pricing, assets stripping and other forms of “tunnelling” 
of revenue and assets from firms (La Porta et al., 1997, 2000). Again, this suggests direct 
involvement of dominant owners in strategic decisions and less emphasis on performance-
enhancing strategies that may benefit minority shareholders. We propose:  
 
Hypothesis 4. The extent of managers’ strategic independence is negatively 
associated ownership concentration. 
   11
The composition of a firm’s board of directors is another governance parameter 
that can affect the decision-making process, shaping the extent of managers’ strategic 
independence (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). Strategy research particularly 
emphasizes the importance of the board’s service and strategic roles when the firm faces 
a highly uncertain environment of economic transition (Peng, 2004). For firms, which 
were until recently operating in the semi-autarchic environment, a particularly positive 
role in this respect may be played by the foreign directors, who supply critical 
information and advice otherwise unobtainable. Board members associated with foreign 
investors also improve monitoring capacity of the board and mitigates moral hazard costs 
associated with managerial decision-making autonomy. Therefore, presence of foreign 
board members may bring in new organizational culture, enhancing managers’ strategic 
independence, and we suggest:  
 
Hypothesis 5. The extent of managers’ strategic independence is positively 
associated with the proportion of foreign directors on the firms’ board. 
 
3. Research Methods 
 
3.1. Sample 
Firm-level data was collected simultaneously in Poland and Hungary in 2001 
using the same structured instrument (translated and back-translated from English into 
Polish and Hungarian, correspondingly). In the course of face-to-face interviews, 
company presidents and CEOs provided information on observable company   12
characteristics and managers’ assessment of their independence along eleven strategic 
dimensions (see below, Section 3.2), each reported on a 7-point Likert scale. Our surveys 
of Polish and Hungarian companies were conducted by the Research Department of the 
Polish Sociological Society jointly with CASE Institute (Warsaw), and by the Institute of 
Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Science respectively. To obtain representative 
samples of large companies, we defined the sample frame using two large company lists 
that are in public domain in Poland and Hungary. In Poland, we used a list of the 500 
largest (in terms of sales) non-financial companies that is maintained by the Institute of 
Economics of the Polish Academy of Sciences and regularly published by the 
Rzeczpospolita. In Hungary, we used a list of the 250 largest companies available from 
the Figyelo magazine. These two lists were combined together, producing a sample frame 
for the survey. The average non-response rate in both countries was below 10%. The 
survey generated 100 and 57 usable questionnaires in Poland and Hungary respectively. 
We verified the representativeness of our sample using available comparison criteria, 
such as size, age, industry affiliation, etc. A standard test of non-response bias indicated 
no significant differences between respondents and non-respondents on variables such as 
country and industry distributions, number of employees, etc. Concerned with inter-rater 
reliability, a randomly selected 5% of companies were re-visited by the interviewers. No 
deviations between the study data and companies’ documents, such as payroll lists, share 
registers, etc. were identified. 
 
3.2. Measures and analysis 
   13
We adopt the structural equation modeling (SEM) approach and estimate SEM 
parameters using Gibbs sampling, a simulation procedure based on the Markov chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) method, implemented in the Bayesian inference package 
WinBUGS (Spiegelhalter et al., 2000). The Bayesian SEM is a more robust research 
methodology because it circumvents the need to rely on asymptotic theory in the 
estimation procedures, which may be questionable when the sample size is small, and, 
therefore, inferences based on maximum likelihood estimates of SEM may be 
overconfident. Another advantage of the Bayesian method is a possibility to impute 
missing values associated with non-responses to the survey questions. (For details see: 
Gelman et al., 2004; Congdon,  2003; Gilks et al., 1996).  
   In the SEM we investigated the relationships between latent (unobservable) 
constructs for managerial independence (ψi), export orientation (ηi) and operating 
performance (ξi) of a firm i. A graphical summary of the SEM is provided in Figure 1, 
where measurable indicators are in boxes and latent variables are in ovals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   14
 
 
Managerial Strategic Independence 
ψi 
Investment 
 
R&D 
Management  
& Organisation 
Systems 
Employment 
 
 
Export Orientation 
ηi 
Proportion of 
exports in sales,  
(expr) 
 
Operating Performance 
ξi 
Controls: 
 
- Employment size, (empl)  
- Industry sector, (lab; res; ser;
   tech)  
- Country, (poland) 
Selection 
of Suppliers 
Choice 
of Trade 
Partners
Selection 
of 
Customers  βind 
βexp 
νind
λ.expr 
βempl 
βlab 
βres 
βser 
βtech 
βpoland 
γ7  γ9  γ11
γ5 
γ4 
γ3
γ2 
Finances  Wages  Pricing Policy 
& Marketing 
Product Mix 
γ10 γ8  γ6 
γ1 
Governance variables: 
 
- Ownership concentration, (lsp) 
- Proportion of foreign directors on  
board,  (for) 
- Largest shareholder is foreign, (fins) 
 
λ.ebtrev 
λ.ebtass 
δlsp  δfor δfins  
 
Export growth, 
1998-2000, 
(expgr) 
λ.expgr
  
Return on sales, 
(ebtrev) 
 
 
 
 
Return on total assets,  
(ebtass) 
 
 
Figure 1. Structural Equation Model 
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To develop managerial independence variable (ψi) we used eleven ordinal 
indicators of the managerial independence yk generated by answers to scaled response 
questions with regard to how much independence management team has in deciding on: 1) 
product mix; 2) selection of customers; 3) selection of suppliers; 4) investment; 5) research 
and development; 6) finances; 7) employment; 8) wages; 9) management and organization 
systems; 10) pricing policy and marketing; 11) choice of trade partners. The answers were 
provided on a 7-point Likert scale with 1 = decided by the owners (i.e. a local parent, 
foreign company, other institutional investors, etc.) and 7 = decided by the firm’s executive 
team. The latent variable for export orientation (ηi) was operationalized by using the 
proportion of export revenues to total sales for 2000 (expri) and the percentage change in 
export sales over the period of 1998-2000 (expgri). The latent variable of operating 
performance (ξi) is operationalized by earnings before taxes over assets (ebtassi) and 
earnings before taxes over sales revenue (ebtrevi) in 2000, although we recognize that 
both these measures have their own shortcomings. Similar measures have been widely 
used (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). 
In terms of corporate governance characteristics, the ownership concentration 
measurement was based on information on the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder. To take account of a possible non-linearity in ownership concentration 
effects, we considered four ownership intervals of less than 25%, 25-49%, 50-74% and 
75-100%. Thus, the ownership concentration was represented by a four-fold categorical 
variable (lspi) defining ownership intervals. The extent of foreign representation on the 
board was measured by the proportion of foreign directors on board (fori). To control for   16
the possible effect of the identity of the largest shareholder, we also introduced a dummy 
variable for the largest shareholder being a foreign firm (finsi). 
Finally, we also considered a number of firm-, industry- and country-level factors 
that may affect performance (see Figure 1). To control for the firm’s size in terms of 
employment, we used three dummies (xi,empl,) for intervals of (250-499), (500-999) and 
(above 1000) of employees respectively. The (below 250) interval was used as a control. 
Four sector dummies (xi,sector) were used for labor-intensive (ISIC codes 15-20 and 36), 
resource-intensive (ISIC codes 21-26), high-tech (ISIC codes 28-35), services and 
construction (ISIC codes 45, 50-52, 55) industries, with firms from heavy industry (ISIC: 
<14 and 27) being used as a control. A dummy variable (xi,poland) was used for companies 
in Poland.  
The Bayesian model includes two parts: (i) a set of measurement equations that 
provide links between the manifest variables discussed above and the three latent 
constructs, and (ii) structural equations which verify the relationships between the latent 
constructs (ψi,  ηi,  ξi), as well as analyze the effects of governance parameters on 
managerial independence (ψi).  We estimated the following SEM, with the following 
structural equations:  
()
()
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1b                                                                                                                                
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2
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, sec , sec exp
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where βind, νind, βexp are parameters associated with interrelations between performance, 
managerial independence and export orientation; λebtrev,  λebtass,  λexpr,  λexpgr,  γk are the 
factor loadings that show how observed indicators determine scores of latent constructs; 
δlsp,δfins,δfor are parameters related to the effects of ownership and board composition on 
managerial independence; βempl, βsector, βpoland are the coefficients for the effects of control 
variables; α, ki  are the intercepts. Equations (2e) include unknown threshold parameters, 
and they specify proportional-odds models for the eleven ordinal indicators of managerial 
independence yk with observed categories jk and factor loadings γk (see Agresti, 1986, and 
Congdon, 2003). 
To ensure identifiability, we defined the three latent variables (ψi,  ηi,  ξi) as 
normally distributed with variances of unity. We also allowed for the monotonicity 
constraint for thresholds θkj  and their ordering by setting truncated standard normal prior 
distributions with zero means and large variances. Since in the Gibbs sampling context 
the predetermined variance identifiability constraint can lead to a problem of  “re-
labelling” of the latent construct scores during the sampling, we followed Congdon 
(2003) and restricted normal priors with zero means and large variances for factor 
loadings and parameters βind, βexp νind, to positive values.  
We verified the convergence of the MCMC simulation using the Gelman-Rubin 
scale reduction factor (SRF) for a two-chain run (Gelman, 1996). We also verified the   18
model’s goodness-of-fit by calculating the posterior p-value (tail-area) probabilities from 
the posterior predictive replications (see Gelman, 1996, and Gelman et al., 2004, for a 
detailed discussion of the construction and computation of the Bayesian χ
2 test).  The 
posterior predictive p-value based on the likelihood-ratio test statistic and 2,000 
predictive replications was equal to 0.227, confirming a good fit between our model and 
the data (Scheines et al. 1999). 
 
4. Results 
 
Table 1 provides the definitions of variables used in this study and the descriptive 
analysis of our data. 68 percent of companies were from the manufacturing sectors, with 
32 percent being from services and construction. Mean employment level in our sample 
was 1063, but the distributions were skewed due to the presence of a few very large 
companies, especially in the Hungarian sub-sample, where the largest company had 
15,599 employees. The distributions of two alternative measures of size, e.g., assets and 
total revenues, followed a similar pattern. Based on the full sample, the mean value of 
total revenues was US$65.5 million while the mean book value of total assets was 
US$42.8 million. In terms of corporate governance parameters, almost half of the firms in 
Hungary and Poland had foreign owners as the largest shareholders. With regard to the 
proportion of shares held by the largest owner, our data indicates a relatively high level of 
share-ownership concentration, e.g., 62.5 percent of the total equity. Foreign directors on 
average held almost a third of board seats.  
   19
Table 1. Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition  Mean  Std.  Dev.
Performance 
ebtrev  Earnings before taxes over sales, %   2.16  8.83 
ebtass  Earnings before taxes over assets, %   0.022  0.17 
Export orientation 
expr  Export revenue as % of total sales  0.25  0.28 
expgr  Change in export sales over 1998-2000, %  1.93  10.41 
Managers’ independence factors 
y1  product mix  5.54  1.89 
y2  selection of customers  5.52  1.67 
y3  selection of suppliers  4.77  2.16 
y4  investment 4.54  2.10 
y5  research and development  4.77  2.11 
y6  finances 5.42  1.72 
y7  employment issues  5.65  1.72 
y8  wages 5.58  1.70 
y9  management and organization   5.42  1.97 
y10  price policy and marketing  5.52  1.86 
y11  choice of trade partners  4.94  2.18 
Corporate governance 
lsp  Proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder, %   62.46  32.60 
for  Proportion of foreign investors’ representatives on board, %  31.12  36.41 
Control variables 
xpoland  Dummy variable for Polish firms  0.64   
xlab  Labor intensive industry (ISIC: 15-20 and 36)  0.36  0.48 
xres  Resource intensive industry (ISIC: 21-26)  0.21  0.41 
xtech  Medium and high technology industry (ISIC: 28-35)  0.06  0.22 
xser  Services and construction (ISIC: 45, 50-52, >55)  0.34  0.47 
xempl  Number of employees  1063  1771 
fins  Largest shareholder is a foreign investor, a dummy variable  0.46  0.50 
 
Table 2 provides the results of SEM estimations of inter-relationships between 
governance, strategic independence and performance.  According to the results of the 
measurement models for the three latent variables, strategic independence proxies were 
within the credible intervals, and they generated a robust latent variable (ψi). Similarly,   20
the export performance and financial performance proxies were also within credible 
intervals, and they generated the corresponding latent variables (ηi, and ξi). 
 
Table 2. Structural Equation Modeling Results  
 
   Credible  interval 
 Mean  2.50%  97.50% 
Measurment models; indicator-factor loadings 
Performance    
    λebtass  0.023 0.018 0.033 
    λebtrev  0.020 0.015 0.029 
Export orientation     
   λexpgr   0.098 0.004 0.258 
    λexpr  0.074 0.002 0.223 
Managerial independence     
γ1  1.991 1.469 2.588 
γ2  2.484 1.901 3.178 
γ3  1.795 1.352 2.309 
γ4  1.716 1.300 2.190 
γ5  2.006 1.528 2.560 
γ6  1.491 1.107 1.932 
γ7  1.677 1.245 2.183 
γ8  1.633 1.200 2.125 
γ9  2.283 1.713 2.937 
γ10  3.009 2.283 3.896 
γ11  1.326 0.959 1.732 
Hypothesized relationships and controls 
Performance, independence and exporting    
  βexp  43.220 28.370  53.510 
  βind  2.191 0.067  6.738 
  νind  0.069 0.003  0.189 
Ownership concentration
1      
  δlsp[2] 25-49%  -0.406 -1.130 0.316 
  δlsp[3] 50-74%  -0.990 -1.687  -0.277 
  δlsp[4] 75-100%  -0.900 -1.613  -0.181 
Proportion of foreign directors on board  δfor  0.058 0.033  0.090 
Employment size
2    
   βempl [2: 250-499 employees]   -4.265 -29.240 16.870 
   βempl [3: 500-999 employees]  4.133 -19.680 23.630 
   βempl [4: 1000 and more]  -10.110 -36.480 12.850 
Poland dummy  βpoland   -36.570 -56.020  -18.780 
Largest shareholder’s identity δfins -0.559 -1.045  -0.060   21
 
NOTES: Highlighted coefficients (in bold) suggest the 5% level of significance. Sectoral 
dummies (all insignificant) and the intercepts are not included in the table. 
1.  Coefficients for ownership concentration are contrasts with a group where the 
largest shareholder owns 24% of shares and less.  
2.  Coefficients are contrasts with a group of firms with 250 employees and less. 
3.  Coefficients are contrasts with heavy industry as a reference group. 
 
SEM results generally supported our hypotheses with regard to the inter-
relationships between managers’ strategic independence, export- and financial- 
performance. In particular, the strategic independence construct was positively associated 
with export orientation (the coefficient νind) and financial performance (the coefficient 
βind). These results support hypotheses 1 and 2. In addition, export orientation was 
positively associated with the latent variable for financial performance (the coefficient 
βexp), and this confirms hypothesis 3. Finally, in terms of the controls, Polish firms 
significantly under performed their Hungarian counterparts, as indicated by the 
coefficient (βpoland). The firm’s size and sector affiliation did not have any effects on 
performance. 
In terms of corporate governance effects on strategic independence, the SEM 
results for ownership concentration suggested that there was a negative effect of block-
holders on strategic flexibility, but it was significant only at very high levels of 
concentration: the coefficients (δlsp) were negative and within the confidence interval for 
(50-74%) and (75-100%) ownership ranges, i.e., the levels of ownership that are above 
the controlling stake, in line with hypothesis 4. The coefficient for the proportion of 
foreigners on board (δfor) was within the confidence intervals, and it was positively 
associated with the strategic independence construct, in line with hypothesis 5. In 
addition, the SEM results provided evidence of a negative but insignificant relationship   22
between the strategic independence construct and the dummy variable for the foreign 
largest shareholder (δfins). 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Our study is one of the first examining simultaneous links between corporate 
governance, managerial independence, exporting and financial performance. The paper 
helps to fill gaps in relation to multi-industry samples and larger newly-privatized 
manufacturing firms. It shows that managerial independence in terms of strategic 
decision-making may play a crucial role as the driver of internationalization and 
performance. The extent of managerial independence is determined by the general 
governance factors, such as ownership and board structures. It has been argued that high 
ownership concentration in transitional economies was investors’ response to low levels 
of protection of minority shareholders in emerging markets (La Porta et al., 1997). 
However, by early 2000s, the quality of the legal environment improved and we argue 
that while the presence of concentrated owners could initially result in firm’s competitive 
advantage, it is likely that ten years after the reform program was implemented, the 
negative effects of private benefit extraction via pyramidal structures mail prevail (Morck 
et al. 2005). Not only we find supporting evidence for this, but also, we identify the 
missing link between ownership and performance, which is managerial independence. In 
particular, restrictions on managerial independence may have negative effects on the 
firm’s internationalization and performance. Although we focus specifically on Poland 
and Hungary, variations in governance regimes (La Porta et al., 1997) suggest scope for   23
international analyses of the links between governance, strategic independence and 
performance. 
  As discussed above, following the privatisation process, control of large 
enterprises in both Hungary and Poland was frequently passed to corporate investors (in 
early 1990s). Empirical studies, which focused on the direct link between the ownership 
and the firm performance were finding a positive relationship between the presence of 
controlling corporate (‘strategic’) investors and performance (see Djankov and Murrell 
2002 for a meta-study summarizing this early research). The positive link was typically 
explained from the resource-based perspective. New corporate owners could offer 
financial resources needed for restructuring (overcoming initial financial constraints), 
access to know-how, marketing and organisational skills.  
  Arguably however, those advantages were temporary. In a market-, competitive 
environment, all companies have capacity for organisational learning, and – as reforms 
were gradually implemented - both access to finance and other-resources could be 
acquired on market basis, without necessity of associating the provision of resources with 
dominant ownership of the firm. In contrast, with better-functioning capital markets, 
those who provided the resources could be sufficiently awarded with minority blocks of 
shares. However, in cases, where the corporate investor retained the dominant position, 
the acquired companies were simply placed at some lower level of pyramidal ownership 
structures; the position, which is frequently associated with lower performance, due to the 
extraction of private benefits by dominant owners (see Morck et al. 2005 and further 
references therein). Low profitability may be seen as a sign of this, consistent with our 
findings.   24
 
In addition, the effects of board representation on export- and performance-
enhancing strategic independence of managers may have important implications for both 
the strategy and the exporting literature. Our research suggests that foreign investors’ 
board involvement is playing a relatively more important strategic role than the size of 
their equity stakes in local firms. This finding is consistent with resource and strategy 
views on corporate governance that suggest that, in addition to control functions, external 
board members may also play service/resource roles in the decision-making process 
(Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990), especially when the firm faces a highly uncertain 
environment of institutional transition (Peng, 2004).  Our evidence suggests that in 
transition economies foreign board members may have a positive impact on the extent of 
managerial independence, which, in turn, underpins exporting and performance. 
In addition, we have found evidence of significant positive link between exporting 
and financial performance in the two transition economies. Exporting, however, is the 
first stage in the firm’s internationalization path (Bernard and Jensen, 1999). As the 
integration of Poland and Hungary into the EU proceeds, performance differences 
between exporting and non-exporting firms may affect their subsequent 
internationalization decision. The longer-term analysis of their strategic dynamics may 
shed new light on complex inter-relationships between corporate governance, business 
strategy and performance. 
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